



Nietzsche's concept of revaluation of values and its potential application for rethinking postmodern constructs

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Abstract. F. Nietzsche's subjectivist approach to the nature of values and their revaluation remains pertinent within the framework of contemporary concepts emphasising the importance of individual worldviews and subjective perceptions of values, offering an alternative to objective interpretations of value and truth. This article aimed to examine the practical application of F. Nietzsche's concept of revaluation of values through the lens of postmodernism. A systemic approach, the historical comparative method, and the method of philosophical reconstruction were employed in this analysis. The axiological dimensions of F. Nietzsche's philosophy were scrutinised, with a particular focus on his critique of decadence values, viewed through the philosopher's subjectivist stance on value formation. The article explored the applicability of F. Nietzsche's idea of "revaluation of values" for critically analysing the "absurd" value systems propagated by postmodernism. These systems promote nihilism, relativism, scepticism, the rejection of absolute truth, existential purposelessness, fatalism, the denial of objective morality, and disillusionment with religion. Postmodern constructs were evaluated concerning their potentially detrimental impact on individual self-affirmation and social cohesion, as the absence of universal values and the rejection of truth's attainability foster ideological manipulations disguised as pluralism and multiculturalism. The practical contribution of this article lies in proposing an ontological criterion for assessing the authenticity of absurd value systems and social constructs

Keywords: absurd value systems; role of the subject in the revaluation of values; axiocentric subjectivism in Nietzsche; decadence values; value construction; nihilism; relativism

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Introduction

Values are the invisible threads that shape human choices, actions, and interactions with the world. Embedded within the framework of worldview beliefs, values serve as fundamental reference points for human activity. They guide decision-making and inform how individuals function in the world, representing what is considered important and meaningful. The question of revaluation of values and the practical application of revaluated values in real-world contexts is both significant and timely. The processes underpinning the formation of new values, the revaluation of old ones, and the destruction of outdated values are crucial for understanding contemporary postmodern value systems. F. Nietzsche's concept of the revaluation of values is central to these considerations, as it lays the groundwork for addressing axiological issues within Western European philosophy. F. Nietzsche highlights the distinctive features and potential of value revaluation, making his ideas pivotal in analysing modern value constructs. This article seeks to examine the applicability of F. Nietzsche's idea of the revaluation of values to the mainstream values and worldview constructs proposed by postmodernism.

The question of the nature of values and their interpretation in F. Nietzsche's philosophy has been extensively explored by researchers. For instance, I. Morrisson (2020) investigates the creation of value systems in F. Nietzsche's thought, emphasising that emotions are fundamental to the formation of such systems. Morrisson asserts that emotions operate at a functional level, forming the core of value patterns that are built around the perception of values. Similarly, D. Harris (2022) examines the notion of post-truth and argues that F. Nietzsche is synonymous with the postmodern conception of truth. Harris suggests that F. Nietzsche possesses a nuanced understanding of what is at stake when discussing truth. Furthermore, he contends that postmodern movements are predominantly concerned with the social, political, and epistemological dimen-

sions of truth rather than its validity or the binary distinction between truth and falsehood.

J. Mitchell (2024) investigates Nietzschean theories of emotion and argues that emotional experiences are crucial in the process of value formation. Such experiences reveal affective intentionality. Therefore, human emotional experiences serve as essential elements in the constitution of values. E. Yigit (2023) defends F. Nietzsche's views on suicide, focusing particularly on F. Nietzsche's conception of life as an aesthetic phenomenon. Yigit claims that F. Nietzsche's position provides epistemic grounds for an alternative concept of self-control and offers insights into understanding one's life. J. Berry (2023) examines F. Nietzsche's perspective on compassion, challenging the common interpretation that he is indifferent to human suffering. She argues that this interpretation is based on an oversimplified understanding of the relevant moral emotions. Berry asserts that a more nuanced reading of F. Nietzsche's key texts could improve comprehension of his critique of compassion and his attitude towards suffering. F. Chouraqui (2024) explores the concept of "the size of future history" as a normative criterion in F. Nietzsche's philosophy. The author argues that F. Nietzsche's critique of normativity and normative judgments becomes coherent when viewed through the lens of this criterion. Chouraqui further contends that this concept could provide a solution to the problem of normative inescapability.

T. Liutyi (2024) analyses the foundational principles of F. Nietzsche's perspective on the origins of nihilism, emphasising nihilism as a distinctive analysis of the modern world. Liutyi highlights that humans can become exponents of the will to non-existence and that the "death of God" symbolises the loss of values that once conferred meaning, purpose, and integrity to human life. R. Cristy (2023) investigates F. Nietzsche's views on cultural change, asserting that F. Nietzsche advocates for neither strictly hierarchical societies ("pyramid societies") nor pluralistic societies

("motley societies") but sees potential in combining aspects of both. She explains that pyramid societies are characterised by unified morality, while motley societies embrace diverse value systems. When combined, these forms can foster extraordinary individuals capable of creating new values and reshaping societies. P. Stewart-Kroeker (2023) examines F. Nietzsche's nihilism in the context of the complicity between Christian morality and modern atheism. The author argues that F. Nietzsche's concept of nihilism critiques Schopenhauer's pessimism, especially regarding the pursuit of truth and the ascetic will to the nothingness that underpins it. From the perspective of O. Stasevska (2021), the modern postmodern condition is marked by a blurring of sociocultural identity due to the erosion of traditional social norms and value systems. Stasevska suggests that this situation necessitates the construction of a sustainable model of identity. Researchers have examined various aspects of F. Nietzsche's axiology; however, greater attention should be directed towards the influence of Nietzschean axiological ideas – particularly the concept of the revaluation of values – on the modern worldview, which has been profoundly shaped by postmodernism.

The research aimed to analyse the peculiarities of applying F. Nietzsche's concept of the revaluation of values within the context of postmodernist ideas. These ideas presented an alternative to classical understandings of truth and values, as postmodernist values were interpreted as subjective and, therefore, relative and personalistic. This often has a negative impact on various forms of cultural and personal identification in human experience.

The article adopted a systemic approach to examine F. Nietzsche's axiological ideas, particularly the "revaluation of values", concerning contemporary philosophical and anthropological issues. The historical-comparative method and the method of philosophical reconstruction are employed to enable a comprehensive analysis of the potential application of F. Nietzsche's axiological theories to the critique of postmodern

constructs. The article focused on the principle of *F. Nietzsche's axiocentric subjectivism*, which highlights the subjective origin of values. It examined F. Nietzsche's constructivist approach to values, emphasising that their revaluation occurs within the framework of self-consciousness. Additionally, the principle of F. Nietzsche's *axiological nihilism* was explored, analysing the essence of the Nietzschean "axiological turn" in philosophy, with particular emphasis on the subject. It is argued that nihilism underpins the secularisation of values. A phenomenological approach was utilised to elucidate the nature of values in F. Nietzsche's philosophy. It was demonstrated that the will to power constitutes the phenomenological foundation of his axiology. Using these approaches, the article analysed the destructive dimensions of the nihilistic understanding of values as reflected in the postmodern worldview.

1. The significance of the subject in the possibility of the revaluation of values.

F. Nietzsche was a pivotal philosophical figure in shaping axiology and values within Western European philosophy. He was among the first philosophers to focus on the specifics of value formation and the first who "asked a question about the origin of values..." (Joas, 2001, p. 22). According to F. Nietzsche (2001), values "...do not possess the value in itself"; objects hold value only when "...assign or attribute the meaning of value" to them. He asserts, "Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature – nature is always valueless". Instead, whatever has value "has been given value at some time, as a present" (p. 301). Consequently, objects acquire meaning and value if, as creative subjects, these are assigned to them.

In value theory, F. Nietzsche is among the first to emphasise the role of the subject and its creative potential in constructing values, much as I. Kant highlights the subject's capacity to construct knowledge in his theory of cognition. Within F. Nietzsche's framework, values emerge through subjective creation and self-comprehension.

He calls for a new creation of values: "...let the value of all things be fixed anew by yourselves!" (Nietzsche, 1899, p. 107). In this vein, he asks: "...Is it not possible... that the necessity may now have arisen of again making up our minds about the reversing and fundamental shifting of values, owing to a new self-consciousness and acuteness in man..." (Nietzsche, 1929, p. 38). Thus, within his philosophy, values are created by humans – the subjects – who serve as the sources of values and are engaged in the process of self-cognition. Accordingly, values are generated by the subject through their fundamental attribute – thinking. This subjectivist approach to the essence of values stands in contrast to the secularising tendencies of Western European philosophy, which posits that values have a transcendent origin and are eternal.

To consider the perspective from which the "reference point" determines the essence of values, it is necessary to explore the characteristics of values to understand the role of the reference point in the hierarchy of values. According to F. Nietzsche, values possess several key features. First, they are "hierarchical", meaning that some values hold greater importance to individuals and represent things that are dearer to the heart, while others are of relatively lesser significance (Kranak, 2014, p. 4). Secondly, values are not independent but are instead "...determined by valuing beings". Thirdly, values are "...completely relative", such that something becomes valuable only when there is a reference point from which its inherent value can be identified and assessed as more or less significant. In F. Nietzsche's view, "when we speak of values, we speak under the inspiration, under the perspective of life: life itself forces us to value to be set, life itself posit values by us, if we estimate values ... (the) "negation of the will to live" – is the decadence instinct itself" (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 28). Here, F. Nietzsche emphasises life as a crucial factor in determining the structure and hierarchy of values, positioning decadence – or the negation of life – as a detrimental influence on the formation of values. He further asserts, "My argument is that all the val-

ues on which mankind now fixes its highest aspirations are decadence-values" (Nietzsche, 1931, p. 46). According to J. Jeong (2022, p. 328), "...decadence implies the disvalue of the way people are physiologically. Different physiological types should develop different dominant or fundamental drives... otherwise, they cannot be active... which leads to physiological decline as the will to power falls off". In other words, when negative values dominate, they engender negative self-perception, directing attention towards destructive aspects of existence and resulting in decadence and moral decay. Conversely, the "reference point" of values, which defines the essence of their worth, is rooted in the phenomenon of life, through which the structuring of values occurs. Simultaneously, F. Nietzsche critiques worldviews and religions that reject "the will to life" and life itself as a value.

From this perspective, the "reference point" of values and the primary value in F. Nietzsche's philosophy is "life", specifically "human life". Based on this, he critiques "decadence-values" (Nietzsche, 1931, p. 46), which he argues negate "life". At the same time, F. Nietzsche's critique of "decadence-values" reflects his recognition of the importance of "human life" as a phenomenon that should not be undermined by religion, particularly Christianity. However, the question arises: to whom does "life" as a "reference point" for the creation and revaluation of values belong? Who has the authority and courage to evaluate or re-evaluate the meaning of life and the values formed based on it? Here, F. Nietzsche highlights the role of the human being – a subject who possesses the right and the courage, through the prism of "one's life", to undertake the revaluation of values, given that no other alternative axiological authority exists for such a process.

From this standpoint, the essence of F. Nietzsche's paradigm of the "revaluation (transvaluation) of all values" lies in *axiocentric subjectivism*. This means that the "source of values" and the "reference point" for values is not solely the "phenomenon of life" itself (as "life" possesses

only ontological significance) but rather the subject – the “bearer of life” – who can comprehend life as a value, in contrast to existing concepts of values, and perform the revaluation of values based on the specifics of their own existence. In this context, the phenomena of “life” and “subject” are synthesised in F. Nietzsche’s theory of values, as the “life of a subject” itself becomes the reference point for values, rather than other dimensions of life, including transcendent ones. In this regard, it may be argued that F. Nietzsche, by emphasising the importance of the subject (as a “bearer of life”) in the process of creating and revaluating values, establishes: the axiocentric subjective paradigm for interpreting values; the concept of the secularisation of values, and, consequently; the foundations for the emergence of axiology as a scientific discipline. Thus, F. Nietzsche develops a subjective approach to interpreting values, positioning the human “self” as the central authority in the creation and classification of values. However, it is essential to note that F. Nietzsche’s framework for the revaluation of values introduces the risk of value relativism, which can be problematic. If values are subject to revaluation, the extremes of such processes may lead to the depreciation and eventual destruction of values.

In support of the opinion regarding the subjective paradigm of values, founded by F. Nietzsche, one can refer to his thinking that “values were only assigned unto things by man... Therefore, he calleth himself ‘man’, i.e., the valuing one. Valuing is creating... Only by valuing is there value...” (Nietzsche, 1899, p. 79). In this context, values are human-centred, and a human is a creature who evaluates, creating values through their thinking, which, in its primal dimensions, was nothing but evaluation, comparison, and the measurement of things as values. In this sense, the phylogenesis of human thinking has axiological origins because, through evaluations and measurements, a human adapted to being and simultaneously developed their thinking. F. Nietzsche (1929) argues that “whichever groups of sensations within a soul awaken most

readily... – these decide ... the general order of rank of its values” (p. 214). In this respect, a human and their psyche are the source of value formation. If the subject “as a bearer of life” creates values through self-realisation and self-cognition (i.e., through one’s thinking), then values “lose” their objective status and transcendent origin, ceasing to be absolute and becoming relative. F. Nietzsche believes that the true measurement of values is the human spirit. He states that “...the transvaluation of all values, this is my formula for mankind’s greatest step towards coming to its senses...” (Nietzsche, 1911, p. 49). F. Nietzsche’s subjective position in this approach to values is confirmed, as is the idea that axiological consciousness is the foundation of human self-consciousness, and ultimately, the essence of a human being itself. In this light, F. Nietzsche’s human is an axiological creature, that is, the “reference point of values”, because he is the “bearer of life” and, consequently, “the criterion of values” through the prism of his life. To F. Nietzsche’s mind, “Life itself appears to me as an instinct for growth, for survival, for the accumulation of forces, for power: whenever the will to power fails there is a disaster. My contention is that all the highest values of humanity have been emptied of this will – that the values of decadence, of nihilism, now prevail under the holiest names” (Nietzsche, 1931, p. 46). The will to power is a subjective phenomenon with a phenomenological dimension. Therefore, there is an inner logic between F. Nietzsche’s nihilism and his critique of objective or transcendent “higher values” and, consequently, between axiological nihilism and his voluntary subjectivism, which forms the basis for the “revaluation of values” (Nietzsche, 1911, p. 49). Thus, through his *axiological nihilism*, F. Nietzsche, paradoxically, *performs an “axiological turn” in philosophy with a focus on the subject*, since, with the help of nihilism, he secularises “higher transcendent values”, but nonetheless proposes the subjective source of the “possibility of value being”, which is the will to power, thus signalling elements of the phenomenological understanding of the nature of values.

In F. Nietzsche's interpretation, the will is simultaneously an *ontological* and *metaphysical* source of the being of humans and a phenomenological source of his axiology.

In the context of the creation of values by the subject "as a bearer of life", F. Nietzsche poses several questions based on the "philosophy of life", which relate to the problem of the origin of values, primarily moral: "...under what conditions did Man invent for himself those judgments of values, "Good" and "Evil"? And what intrinsic value do they possess in themselves?" (Nietzsche, 1887, p. iv). That is to say, he believes that a human "invents the judgments about values" (Nietzsche, 1887, p. iv), and therefore, "we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values is... to be called into question..." (Nietzsche, 1887, p. viii). From this perspective, F. Nietzsche's critique of traditional values is based on granting life the "reference point" of values and giving the subject the ability to reevaluate values based on one's own life. In this sense, the possibility of the revaluation of values has a subjective ground because a human essentially "invents the judgments about values" (Nietzsche, 1887, p. iv), and hence is their only creator.

However, subjectivity as the source of F. Nietzsche's revaluation of values should not be interpreted only in the context of nihilism and relativism. The subject does not merely perform an act of axiological nihilism, chaotically denying any values, or, for example, "decadence-values" (Nietzsche, 1931, p. 46); he does not simply create a pluralism of relative values based on one's narrow, limited viewpoint (a great number of subjects as "value creators" tend to *absolute relativism* of values). F. Nietzsche's subject is understood as the species-level being of a human, where the subject's ground is thought itself. It is in the context of the understanding of F. Nietzsche's "subject as thinking" that the revaluation of values takes place because a subject, on its species level, based on thinking as their species feature, has the capacity to "invent values", just as a human in I. Kant has the a priori capability to create knowledge. From this perspective, such an "a priori"

capability, based on which the subject can "create values" and "invent values", is the a priori possession of a phenomenon of life by the subject, which becomes an a priori origin for the creation of new values.

Certainly, one could argue here that if, in F. Nietzsche's view, one can trace "axiocentric subjectivism" in his value theory, then his value theory tends towards absolute relativism. This is because if the subject creates values, systems of any values can be created, including absurd values, fictional values, and at the same time, equality of values and their multiculturalism can allegedly be ensured, as there is a need to respect the ideas and feelings of everyone and admit the right to existence of various identifications, even absurd ones. However, in the opinion of the authors of this article, it is F. Nietzsche's idea about the subject's revaluation of values that can serve, paradoxically, as a reliable criterion for the critique of those values that contradict life and its needs. F. Nietzsche, in developing his theory of values, criticises "decadence-values" (Nietzsche, 1931, p. 46) and Christian values, as they deny life impulses, instincts, and the will to life. If it is assumed that the subject creates absurd values (as the subject is considered an "inventor of values") and that the rules of a good liberal tone force the acceptance of the right to existence of various values in the context of liberalism and multiculturalism (in order not to offend the feelings of various subcultures' representatives), then the final criterion of the truthfulness of values, as stated by F. Nietzsche, can be the "phenomenon of life", which is ontological and, through its ontological nature and will to life, will spontaneously deny absurd systems of values that are theoretical and promoted through some religion or subculture.

Therefore, whatever theoretical value systems (even the most absurd) are created by the subject as a "value creator" or "value inventor", on the practical level, the possibility of the realisation of the values created by the subject will be "tested" by life itself, which, as an ontological phenomenon, cannot be negated by the subject as a creator

of values by any means. The subject, as a “creator of values” (as a theorist of values, who, let to assume, is driven by liberal principles and is focused on multiculturalism), will be forced to listen to the requirements of life and its needs, regardless.

Thus, the absurd value systems, even if they are recognised by the majority by voluntary conviction or under coercion, even if the majority comes to an agreement and accepts the recognition of these absurd values, such artificial and absurd values will still not be able to function for long, because they will contradict the very laws of “life” and the “will to live”. Life itself is capable of destroying the systems of absurd values and systems of agreed values that contradict life. In this perspective, the construction of values and social constructs, no matter how specific they are in their assertion, must be consistent with life as the last reliable criterion of any values.

2. Postmodern social constructs in the context of revaluation of values.

F. Nietzsche speaks about several ideas that he proposes to be reevaluated, such as “... (the) ideas of certainty, cause and effect, will to the preservation, and subjectivity so that we more highly value uncertainty, continual creativity, will to power, and subjectivity (over and above objectivity)” (Kranak, 2014, p. 50). Some of these ideas (or derivatives from those mentioned above), such as the idea of certainty (absolute truth) and will to preservation, and their reevaluation, have a profound effect on the processes that are happening in today’s society. Specifically, they shape how humans operate and function. In this regard, the idea of social constructs in postmodernism and how F. Nietzsche’s views influenced and shaped the ideas generally accepted today at the level of social constructs will be explored.

“Social construct” is the idea that various social phenomena are maintained by social norms and standards, rather than being universal or natural phenomena. However, this idea has some flaws; for example, it can lead to absurd statements, such as everything being a product of social

construction, rather than biological or objective truth and objective life conditions. The extreme relativism adjacent to this theory (which grants the possibility to discard some notions, concepts, or facts if they do not fit an ideological agenda) can make it difficult to establish any generally meaningful form of basic standards or agreement. If the idea of truth is rejected and everything is claimed to be relative, an infinite number of possible truths emerge, even if they concern the same thing. However, if there is no universal truth, there is no possibility of finding common ground or agreeing on universal human values.

2.1. The critique of the idea of absolute truth.

In this aspect, F. Nietzsche’s views are a foundational source of the development of postmodernism, with its idea of the negation of absolute truth. F. Nietzsche was critical of the idea of absolute truth, specifically with regard to “...our limitations to achieve truth”, and he feared that “...the finding of absolute truth may hurt healthy human activity” (Kranak, 2014, p. 25). Thus, healthy human activity is “...whatever contributes to the health of a culture, and what defines a healthy culture is one that attains great cultural achievements and is admired by later generations” (Kranak, 2014, p. 25). Healthy cultures tend to produce healthy philosophies, which strengthen them. And it works the other way around too: unhealthy cultures produce unhealthy philosophies, only making things worse: “...if philosophy ever manifested itself as helpful, redeeming or prophylactic, it was in a healthy culture. The sick it made even sicker” (Nietzsche, 1962, p. 33). F. Nietzsche’s ideas about perspectivism, falsification, and the metaphorical value of language – “...all these topics can be related to the idea that to know is to interpret... the knowing subject... creates something, instead of merely replicate a state of affairs” (Gori, 2013, p. 72). From this perspective, one rejects the traditional characteristics of truth – absoluteness and indisputability. According to F. Nietzsche, “...there is no “Truth”, but only an indefinite amount of world-interpretations, of

world-descriptions, of viewpoints that cannot be a priori rejected as absolutely false" (Gori, 2013, p. 72). Consequently, such Nietzschean critiques of truth have developed in today's postmodern worldview, which rejects the concept of absolute truth altogether. However, the postmodern depreciation of the idea of truth leads to absurdity and the loss of common sense. It leads to unhealthy human practices, where, if one departs from the current mainstream line of thinking, that person is ostracised, neglected, and shamed. Ironically, this works only if the person argues against the common line of thinking of postmodernists and seeks to substantiate or prove the contrary to the current mainstream idea. If the situation is reversed, however, that person is praised for bravery and supported in any way. This, in turn, leads to a dangerous situation, where, even if people know that some idea is factually untrue, they must pretend it is true, or they will face social consequences and sanctions. Such an approach of playing along with fictional social constructs may work in a social bubble (let's say a campus or a country that doesn't face any real external threats and is in a state of stability and prosperity). This does not work, however, in the real world, where, for example, wars are waged. It cannot be assumed that architectural buildings, or, for example, a bridge over a river, are built based on the assumption that $2 + 2 = 5$. Such an assumption just won't work in practical life, even if the feelings of people who think so will be greatly hurt. Real buildings cannot be constructed based on such false assumptions.

Moreover, "...if we are to assume that the overcoming of nihilism is more important than discovering truth, then it is acceptable to adopt untrue ideas if they are useful in overcoming nihilism...it does mean that whether an idea is true, untrue, or partially true is irrelevant if it serves the more important project of revaluation" (Kranak, 2014, p. 10). This irrelevance is especially harmful if one tries to adopt or implement factually incorrect ideas into life, ignoring the signs and warnings that suggest otherwise. This is only

possible when everything is relative and there is no truth. Usually, a person using common sense assumes that there is truth that can be comprehended and, therefore, acts based on this, although postmodernism emphasises subjectivity and relativism and negates the possibility of the existence of absolute truth.

F. Nietzsche also discusses value feelings, criticising the elevation of these value feelings to absolute value principles (Nietzsche, 1967). These value feelings are described as "aversion and partiality" (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 32), and feelings of "respect and antipathy" (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 107). Thus, "...the creation of new values is the creation of new feelings" (Kranak, 2014, p. 46). This idea is heavily reflected in today's postmodernist belief that feelings are the most important criterion for whether something is true, has value, or is beneficial to society.

2.2. Deconstructive aspects of the nihilistic void of values.

The danger of offending someone's feelings or beliefs should not be an obstacle in the pursuit of sincere truth. Value feelings have become so important in today's world specifically because nihilism promotes the idea that life lacks purpose, meaning, or value. But, if there is no purpose in life, any of peoples' actions are pointless; if there is no meaning, then there is a profound existential void; if there is no value, then life itself is not valuable. The combination and aggregation of all these postmodernist ideas lead to the deconstruction of worldview and sociality, particularly to suicidal thinking and the rejection of procreation (if life has no meaning, why bring children into this world, only to suffer?). If nothing matters, then such a void of values leads to apathy, depression, tragedy, unhappiness, and social deconstruction. Such nihilistic rejection of being can happen on an individual level; however, if many people in society adopt this nihilistic type of thinking, then society is committing cultural and literal suicide.

Such negative thinking about the possibility of the existence of truth and universal values also

leads to the social rejection of maturing, since adult life brings challenges and hardships. If life is hard enough already, why mature and deal with all those consequences if it is possible to pretend that those problems don't exist in the social bubble created? There will simply be no need to deal with reality, and only the need to live in the created and fictional world, especially since it is the adopted way of thinking, which others should respect and accept, even if it is wrong, harmful, or absurd.

In this context, it is also important to discuss the “revaluator of values”, or rather the subject who will be conducting the process of reevaluation of values. Adherence to Christian traditional moral values is often straightforward, as belief in such values is reinforced by the reassurance that they originate from a higher, perfect, and ideal being. But when it comes to the newly crafted postmodernist ideas, they, as social constructs, are created by humans, and people are often mistaken because they are imperfect. In this sense, it is impossible to find a reliable criterion for the verification of the truthfulness of postmodernist ideas other than one's feelings, which should not be offended, even if they are the criteria for accepting absurd social constructs. Furthermore, to assure everyone to adhere to these new postmodernist values and social constructs, one must either coerce them into doing so or convince them that these new alternative constructs matter, since there is no absolute truth. Hence, what is the reason to question these new values and social constructs if everything is subjective anyway? Even when new values and constructs appear ridiculous, harmful, or absurd, there is always the possibility of disregarding dissenting opinions altogether. As F. Nietzsche (2001, p. 335) states, “It is selfish to consider one's own judgement a universal law ... that is, in relation to the idea that I proposed ... everyone must judge as I do”.

The reevaluation of some values, particularly the value of truth, has already happened. Currently, modern liberal societies are dominated by those values and postmodern social constructs

that mainly promote nihilism, a value system that exalts to the status of highest values relativity, subjectivity, rejection of absolute truth, fatalism, rejection of objective morality, scepticism, absurdity, disillusionment, and the rejection of religion. Such an approach to values, where only the negative, life-harming values are given the status of highest values, is destructive, depressive, hurtful, counterproductive, and dangerous. Such an approach may even lead to moral paralysis, where there is no distinction between moral or immoral, just or unjust actions since harmful ideologies cannot be condemned. *Postmodernist axiological nihilism* and the destruction of the notion of absolute truth, or the rejection by postmodernism of at least the attainability of truth, is a harmful and destructive idea that may lead to dangerous consequences in society. The postmodern idea that feelings are more important than truth is also harmful to the formation of constructive social and individual identifications.

3. The new revaluation of values.

In the authors' view, there is a need for a new revaluation of values in modern society, because the world is ever-changing, and those social constructs, such as postmodernism, which are currently widespread in modern liberal societies, are no longer progressive. On the contrary – they are the cause of moral decadence and the loss of the sense of human existence, contributing to suicidal tendencies in human behaviour. One of the prominent human traits is adaptability; humans “...mimic not just the forms and behaviors of other human beings but also their values. Such mimicry permits the individual to pursue his own advantage insofar as assimilation makes his interests and society's interests appear identical” (Meredith, 2024, p. 294). Hence, if certain value systems are inherited as a cultural legacy, formed at a specific point in the history of humanity, the idea that these should remain unchanged – regardless of the current scientific, technological, social, political, or legal changes taking place in the world – is incorrect.

Such a revaluation of values, which were shaped by the postmodernist tradition, should take place and is necessary. However, this revaluation of values should be based on different grounds from those postmodernism proposes today. Striving towards more universal values that focus on basic human decency, social responsibility, honesty, fairness, and enlightenment is essential. This universal revaluation of postmodern values can be rooted in F. Nietzsche's ideas regarding the criterion of the revaluation of values, which is the phenomenon of life. Even if one assumes that reality appears different for different groups of people because they use different social constructs and allegedly live in different realities, real social problems, such as famine, war, and natural catastrophes, can still serve as indicators that multiculturalism and pluralism – the negation of truth as “theoretic mind games” – are possible only in stable and protected societies.

The objective processes of social being (surprisingly, they also exist) alongside social postmodernist constructs, and these objective processes, make significant adjustments to the theoretical comprehension of being. Therefore, in the situation of war, for example, which has been occurring in Eastern Europe since 2022, postmodern ideas about the impossibility of the existence of objective truth are destructive. In reality, there is an aggressor, who cannot be interpreted otherwise; that is, he cannot be equated with a victim because he is committing the genocide of Ukrainians and destroying civil infrastructure in Ukraine. If, in evaluating this war, the truthfulness of some other alternative opinion is admitted – because the feelings of the aggressor should not be hurt and his opinion that he is not the aggressor should be respected – then such an approach is not only untrue but also inhumane, because it is Ukrainians who are dying on their land, and the criterion for the truth of judgments about the aggressor is human lives, which are being lost by the thousands every day in this war.

The postmodern idea about the impossibility of the attainability of truth can be applied

unless concerning the cognition of ontological reasons but by no means to ethical, legal, or personal identifications. If one allows pluralism and multiculturalism in ethics, law, self-esteem, and selfunderstanding, then such alternative social constructs in the fields of ethics, law, and personal identification are destructive because human destiny and human life are at stake. In this aspect, F. Nietzsche's idea of life as a criterion for the revaluation of values is relevant and promising in the context of the analysis of social constructs for their genuineness.

Conclusions

The article investigated the subjectivist approach of F. Nietzsche regarding the creation and revaluation of values. It is stated that F. Nietzsche was one of the first philosophers to attribute thinking as a necessary component for the creation of values. The authors argued that F. Nietzsche criticises decadence values and positions the human (a subject) in a position to evaluate or reevaluate values. From this perspective, axiocentric subjectivism becomes the essence of F. Nietzsche's paradigm of the revaluation of values, as the subject is the “bearer of life”, and the life of a subject becomes the reference point for values. By accentuating the importance of the subject, F. Nietzsche establishes an axiocentric subjective paradigm of interpreting values and the idea of secularisation of values. It is asserted that F. Nietzsche performs an axiological shift in philosophy by emphasising the subject, secularising transcendent values, and proposing the subjective source of the possibility of value being (the will to power).

The article also stated that F. Nietzsche criticised the idea of absolute truth, which, in turn, is reflected in today's postmodern view of the negation of truth. Such postmodern depreciation of truth leads to extreme relativism and absurdity, as there is no criterion to evaluate the truthfulness of an idea. The combination of postmodern ideas concerning the lack of purpose, meaning, or value in life leads to a value and existential

void, which deconstructs the worldview and sociality. The negation of truth and the irrelevance of truth leave no opposition to harmful values or ideologies, as everything is relative and cannot be criticised because feelings play a more important role than truth.

It was argued that the new revaluation of values should differ from what postmodernism presents. New, more universal values should revolve around basic human decency, social responsibility, honesty, fairness, and enlightenment. The authors proposed that such a revaluation of postmodern values can occur on the grounds of the phenomenon of life as a criterion for the revaluation of values. In situations involving the objective processes of social existence (such as famine, war, and natural cataclysms), the ideas of the absence of truth and postmodern constructs that negate objectivity or emphasise relativity are

harmful to humans and their lives.

The research is relevant in the context of addressing the crisis of traditional values, as most values of modern civilisation are interpreted through the lens of postmodernism and tend towards relativity, and in extreme cases, absurdity (for example, the negation of the possibility of the existence of truth). Additionally, the conclusions of the research can be applied to further comprehension of the criteria and principles of the new revaluation of values, which should be directed towards understanding the value of human life and human dignity.

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Conflict of Interest

None.

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Ідея переоцінки цінностей Ф. Ніцше та можливість її застосування для переосмислення постмодерністських конструктів

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Анотація. Суб'єктивістський підхід Ф. Ніцше до природи цінностей та їх переоцінки є актуальним у контексті сучасних мейнстримних концептів важливості індивідуального світогляду та особистого відчуття цінностей, які є альтернативою об'єктивному розумінню природи цінностей та природи істини. Мета статті – дослідити практичне застосування ідеї Ф. Ніцше про переоцінку цінностей крізь призму постмодернізму. Системний підхід, історично-порівняльний метод та метод філософської реконструкції були використанні у статті. Аксиологічні особливості філософії Ф. Ніцше проаналізовані у статті. Позиція Ф. Ніцше стосовно декадансу цінностей розглядалася з точки зору суб'єктивістського підходу філософа до природи цінностей. У статті зверталася увага на можливість застосування ідеї Ф. Ніцше про «переоцінку цінностей» для критичного аналізу «абсурдних» ціннісних систем, які пропонуються постмодернізмом, який акцентує увагу на ідеях нігілізму, релятивізму, скептицизму, відсутності абсолютної істини, відсутності мети життя, екзистенційної порожнечі, фаталізму, відмови від об'єктивної моральності, абсурдності, розчарування, відмови від релігії. Постмодерні світоглядні конструкти досліджувались у контексті їхнього деструктивного впливу на процеси самоствердження індивіда та соціальних взаємодій, оскільки відсутність універсальних цінностей та заперечення можливості досягнення істини веде до світоглядних маніпуляцій, які можуть поширюватись під прапором плюралізму та мультикультуралізму. Практична цінність статті полягає в тому, що вона пропонує онтологічний критерій для перевірки справжності абсурдних ціннісних систем та соціальних конструктів

Ключові слова: абсурдні системи цінностей; роль суб'єкта в переоцінці цінностей; аксіоцентричний суб'єктивізм Ніцше; цінності декадансу; конструювання цінностей; нігілізм; релятивізм